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FUTURE MINDS: TRANSHUMANISM, COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND THE
NATURE OF PERSONS1
(Forthcoming in the Penn Bioethics Reader (Vardit Radvisky, Art Caplan, et. al.)
Susan Schneider
University of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Philosophy, Institute for Cognitive Science, and
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience
sls@sas.upenn.edu

Transhumanism is a philosophical, cultural and political movement which holds that the
human species is now only in a comparatively early phase and that its very evolution will
be altered by developing technologies.2 Future humans will, in effect, be very unlike their
current incarnation in both physical and mental capacities and more like certain persons
depicted in science fiction novels. Transhumanists share the belief that an outcome in
which humans have radically advanced intelligence, near immortality, deep friendships
with AI (artificial intelligence) creatures, and elective body characteristics, is a very
desirable end for both one‘s own personal development and for the development of our
species as a whole. Despite its science fiction-like flavor, the issues that Transhumanism
presents deserve to be taken seriously. For the beginning stages of this radical alteration
are supposed to be the outcome of technological developments that are either here, if not
generally available, or more commonly, technologies that are accepted by many in the
relevant scientific fields as being on their way.3 In the face of all these technological
developments, transhumanists present a thought provoking and highly controversial
progressive bioethics agenda. Transhumanism offers intriguing perspectives on (inter
alia) one‘s conception of the good life, the nature of persons, and the nature of mind.
Time is short. So here is what I propose to do. After covering the basic tenets of
Transhumanism, I discuss what I take to be the most important philosophical element of
the tranhumanist picture -- its unique perspective on the nature and development of
persons. Persons are traditionally regarded as being an important moral category, being
the bearers of rights (if you believe in such) or at least deserving of consideration in the
utilitarian calculus. And, as we shall see, considering the nature of persons through the
lens of Transhumanism involves pushing up against the boundaries of the very notion of
personhood. Consider, for example, the enhancement debate. When one considers
whether to enhance in the radical ways the Transhumanists advocate, one must ask, ―will
this radically enhanced creature still be me?‖ If not, then, on the reasonable assumption
1 . Thanks to Vardit Radvisky and James Hughes for their helpful comments on this chapter.
2 Julian Huxley apparently coined the term ‗transhumanism‘ in 1957, when he wrote that in the near future
―the human species will be on the threshold of a new kind of existence, as different from ours as ours is
from that of Peking man.‖ New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), 13-17.
3. Converging Technologies for Improved Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology,
Information Technology and Cognitive Science, Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridge, eds.,
(Arlington, Va: National Science Foundation/Dept. of Commerce, 2002. Available at: wtec.org/Converging
Technologies.

that one key factor in a decision to enhance oneself is one‘s own personal development,
even the most progressive bioethicist will likely regard the enhancement in question as
undesirable. For when you choose to enhance in these radical ways, the enhancement
does not really enhance you. Examining the enhancement issue through the vantage point
of the metaphysical problem of personal identity shall thereby present a serious challenge
to Transhumanism. Indeed, this is a pressing issue for any argument made for or against
enhancement.

I. The Main Tenets of Transhumanism

Transhumanism is by no means a monolithic ideology, but it does have an organization
and an official declaration. The World Transhumanist Association is an international
nonprofit organization that was founded in 1998 by philosophers Nick Bostrom and
David Pearce. Its tenets were laid out in the Transhumanist Declaration, (1998):
The Transhumanist Declaration
―(1) Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the
feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the
inevitability of aging, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen psychology,
suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth.
(2) Systematic research should be put into understanding these coming developments and
their long-term consequences.
(3) Transhumanists think that by being generally open and embracing of new technology
we have a better chance of turning it to our advantage than if we try to ban or prohibit it.
(4) Transhumanists advocate the moral right for those who so wish to use technology to
extend their mental and physical (including reproductive) capacities and to improve their
control over their own lives. We seek personal growth beyond our current biological
limitations.
(5) In planning for the future, it is mandatory to take into account the prospect of
dramatic progress in technological capabilities. It would be tragic if the potential benefits
failed to materialize because of technophobia and unnecessary prohibitions. On the other
hand, it would also be tragic if intelligent life went extinct because of some disaster or
war involving advanced technologies.
(6) We need to create forums where people can rationally debate what needs to be done,
and a social order where responsible decisions can be implemented.
(7) Transhumanism advocates the well-being of all sentience (whether in artificial
intellects, humans, posthumans, or non-human animals) and encompasses many
principles of modern humanism. Transhumanism does not support any particular party,
politician or political platform.‖

This document was followed by the much longer and extremely informative
Transhumanist Frequently Asked Questions (1999), authored by Nick Bostrom, in
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consultation with dozens of leading transhumanists (2003a).4 Because the current chapter
is brief and cannot touch on all elements of Transhumanism, the reader is strongly
encouraged to read this document for a more complete overview of Transhumanism.5

II The Nature of Persons

Now let us do philosophy on some of the ideas expressed in this declaration. Overall,
central Transhumanist texts have advanced a sort of trajectory for the personal
development of a contemporary human, technology permitting. (Kurzweil, 1999, 2005;
Bostrom, 2003a, 2005a).
21st Century Unenhanced Human -> Significant “upgrading” with cognitive and
other physical enhancements–> Posthuman Status -> “Superintelligence”

By way of illustration, suppose it is now 2025 and being a technophile, you purchase
cognitive and physical enhancements as they become readily available. First, you add a
mobile internet connection to your retina, then, you enhance your working memory by
adding neural circuitry. You are now officially a cyborg. Now skip ahead to 2040.
Through nanotechnological therapies/enhancements you are able to extend your lifespan,
and as the years progress, you continue to accumulate more far reaching enhancements.
By 2060, after several small but cumulatively significant alterations, you are a
―Posthuman.‖ Posthumans are possible future beings, ―whose basic capacities so
radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by
our current standards.‖ (Bostrom, 2003a) Such can be AI devices, humans who have
uploaded their brains onto computers and then enhanced them, or humans who are the
result of making many small but cumulatively profound enhancements. (Bostrom, 2003a)
At this point, your intelligence is enhanced not just in terms of speed of mental
processing; you are now able to make profound connections that you were not able to
make before. Unenhanced humans, or ―Naturals‖ seem to you to be intellectually
disabled -- you have little in common with them -- but as a Transhumanist, you are
supportive of their right to not enhance. (Bostrom, 2003a; Kurzweil, 2005 Garreau,
2005).

4 Bostrom is a philosopher at Oxford University who now directs the transhumanist oriented Future of
Humanity Institute there.
5. This document was updated in 2003 and is available at the World Transhumanist Association website. In
addition, there are a number of excellent philosophical and sociological works that articulate key elements
of the Tranhumanist perspective. (E.g., Bostrom 2005; Hughes, X; Kurzweil, 1999 and 2005). For
extensive web resources on transhumanism see Nick Bostrom‘s homepage, Ray Kurzweil‘s newsgroup
(KurzweilAI.net), The Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies homepage, and the World
Transhumanist Association homepage.
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It is now 2600. For years, worldwide technological developments, including your own
enhancements, have been facilitated by Superintelligent AI. Indeed, ―creating
superintelligence may be the last invention that humans will ever need to make, since
superintelligences could themselves take care of further scientific and technological
development‖ (Bostrom, 2003a). And the slow addition of better and better neural
circuitry has now resulted in there being no real intellectual difference in kind between
you and Superintelligent AI -- you too are a ―Superintelligence”, a creature with the
capacity to radically outperform the best human brains in practically every field,
including scientific creativity, general wisdom, and social skills.‖ (Bostrom, 2003a)6 The
only real difference between you and an AI creature of standard design is one of origin –
you were once a ―natural‖. But you are now almost entirely engineered by technology –
you are perhaps more aptly characterized as a member of a rather heterogeneous class of
AI life forms. (Kurzweil, 2005)
This, then, is a very rough sketch of the developmental trajectory that the Transhumanist
generally aspires to.7 Now, let us ask: should you embark upon this journey? 8 Here,
there are deep philosophical questions which have no easy answers. For in order to
understand whether you should enhance, you must first understand what you are to begin
with. But what is a person? And given your conception of a person, after such radical
changes, would you still be you or would you actually bear little relation to the person
you were before? And if the latter situation is the case, why would embarking on the path
to radical enhancement be something you value? For wouldn‘t it instead be a path which
leads to your own demise, leading you away from your true self, ultimately causing you
to cease to exist? In order to make such a decision one needs to understand the
metaphysics of personal identity -- that is, one needs to answer the question: What is it in
virtue of which a self or person is supposed to continue existing over time? A good place
to begin is to consider that everyday objects seem to persist over time. Consider the
espresso machine in your favorite café. Suppose that five minutes have elapsed and
suppose the barrista has turned the machine off. Imagine asking the barrista if the
machine is still the same machine, despite this change. The ordinary answer is that it is of
course possible for the machine to continue to be one and the same thing over time. This
seems to be a reasonable case of its persistence, even though at least one of the machine‘s
6 There are of course numerous nuances to this rough picture. For instance, some Transhumanists believe
that the move from unenhanced human to superintelligence will be extremely rapid because we are
approaching a ‗singularity‘, a point at which the creation of superhuman intelligence will result in massive
changes in a very short period (e.g., 30 yrs.). (Bostrom, 1998; Kurzweil, 1999, 2005; Vinge, 1993). Other
transhumanists hold that technological changes will not be so sudden. These discussions often debate the
reliability of Moore‘s law (Moore, 1965). Another key issue is whether a transition to superintelligence will
really occur because the upcoming technological developments involve grave risk. The risks of
biotechnology and AI concern Transhumanists, progressive bioethicists more generally, as well as
bioconservatives. Garreau,,2005 Joy, 2000, Bostrom, 2002; Annis, 2000.
7. It should be noted that Transhumanism by no means endorses every sort of enhancement. For example,
Nick Bostrom rejects ‗positional enhancements‘ (enhancements primarily employed to increase one‘s
social position) yet argues for enhancements which could allow humans to develop ways of exploring ―the
larger space of possible modes of being.‖(2005a, p.11).
8. For mainstream anti-enhancement positions on this question see e.g., Fukuyama, 2002. Kass, 2003,
Annas, 2000.
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features or properties has changed. On the other hand, if the machine disintegrated or
melted, then it would no longer be the same machine. It wouldn‘t be an espresso machine
at all for that matter. So some changes do not cause a thing to cease to exist while others
do. Philosophers call features or properties which are essential to a thing or person‘s
nature ―essential‖ properties.
Now reconsider the Transhumanist‘s trajectory for enhancement: for radical enhancement
to be a worthwhile option for you, it has to represent a desirable form of personal
development; at bare minimum, even if enhancement brings such goodies as superhuman
intelligence and radical life extension, it must not involve the elimination of one of your
essential properties. For in this case, the sharper mind and fitter body would not be
experienced by you – they would be experienced by someone else. For even if you would
like to become ―superintelligent‖, knowingly embarking upon a path that trades away one
or more of your essential properties would be tantamount to suicide – that is, to your
intentionally causing yourself to cease to exist. So before you enhance, you had better
get a handle on what your essential properties are.
Key Transhumanists have grappled with this issue. For instance, Ray Kurzweil asks:
―So who am I? Since I am constantly changing, am I just a pattern? What if
someone copies that pattern? Am I the original and/or the copy? Perhaps I
am this stuff here – that is, the both ordered and chaotic collection of
molecules that make up my body and brain.‖ (Kurzweil, 2005, p. 383)
Kurzweil is here referring to two theories at center stage in the age old philosophical
debate about what properties determine the nature of persons. The leading theories are the
following:
1. ―The Ego theory‖ – a person‘s nature is her ―soul‖ or non-physical mind, and this mind
or soul can survive the death of the body.9
2. ―The Psychological Continuity Theory‖ – you are essentially your memories and
ability to reflect on yourself (Locke) and more generally, your overall psychological
configuration; what Kurzweil referred to as your ―pattern.‖ 10
3. ―Materialism‖ -- you are essentially the material that you are made out of – what
Kurzweil referred to as ―the ordered and chaotic collection of molecules that make up my
brain and body‖ (Kurzweil).

9 For nice surveys of these four positions see Simon Blackburn, 1999 and Olson, 2008.
10 John Locke, 1694, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter 27, second edition (Note: this
chapter first appears in the second edition). (It is also reprinted as ―Of Identity and Diversity,‖ in Perry
(1975)). For other attempts to develop similar views see Anthony Quinton, (July 1962), ―The Soul,‖ The
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 59, no. 15. and Paul Grice, ―Personal Identity,‖ Mind, vol. 50 (Oct. 1941). Both
are also reprinted in Perry (1975).
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4. ―The No Self View‖ - there is no metaphysical category of person. The ―I‖ is a
grammatical fiction (Nietzsche). There are bundles of impressions but no underlying self
(Hume). There is no survival because there is no person (Buddha, Parfit).
Each of these views has its own position about whether to enhance. If you hold (1) then
your decision to enhance depends on whether you believe the enhanced body would
retain the same soul or immaterial mind.11 If you believe (3), then any enhancements
must not alter your material substrate. In contrast, according to (2), or ―Patternism‖,
enhancements can alter the material substrate but must preserve your memories and your
overall psychological configuration. Finally, (4) contrasts sharply with (1)-(3). If you
hold (4), then the survival of the person is not an issue, for there is no person to begin
with. But you may strive to enhance nonetheless, to the extent that you may find intrinsic
value in adding more superintelligence to the universe – you might value life forms with
higher forms of consciousness and wish that your closest ―continuent‖ should be such a
creature.
Let us focus on identifying which of these conceptions conforms to the Transhumanist
notion of the self, at least in its most characteristic incarnation. Consider that
Transhumanists generally adopt a Computational Theory of Mind. That is, the mind is
essentially the ―program‖ running on the hardware of the brain, where by ―program‖
what is meant is the algorithm that the mind computes, something in principle
discoverable by cognitive science.12 Because, at least in principle, the brain‘s
computational configuration can be preserved in a different medium, i.e., in silicon as
opposed to carbon, with the information processing properties of the original neural
circuitry preserved, the computationalist rejects the materialist view of the nature of
persons.13 Indeed, Materialism seems to falter in embracing the very idea that you are
what you are made up of:
―The specific set of particles that my body and brain comprise are in fact
completely different from the atoms and molecules that I comprised only a short
while ago. We know that most of our cells are turned over in a matter of weeks,
and even our neurons, which persist as distinct cells for a relatively long time,
nonetheless change all of their constituent molecules within a month….I am
rather like the pattern that water makes in a stream as it rushes past the rocks in
its path. The actual molecules of water change every millisecond, but the pattern
persists for hours or even years.‖ (Kurzweil, 2005, 383)

11 It should be noted that although a number of bioconservatives seem to uphold the soul theory the soul
theory is not, in and of itself, an anti-enhancement position. For why can‘t one‘s soul or immaterial mind
inhere in the same body even after radical enhancement?
12 Computational theories of mind can appeal to various computational theories of the format of thought
(e.g., connectionism, dynamicism, symbolicsm, or some combination thereof). See Kurzweil, 2005. For
philosophical background see Block, 1995; Churchland, 1996.
13. This commonly held but controversial view in philosophy of cognitive science is called ―multiple
realizability‖ (Kim, 2006); Bostrom calls it ‗Substrate Independence‘ in his 2003c.
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Kurzweil calls his view ―Patternism‖ (2005, p386). Patternism is an updated version of
the Psychological Continuity Theory. Put in the language of cognitive science, as the
transhumanist surely would, what is essential to you is your computational configuration
– e.g., what sensory systems/subsystems your brain has (e.g., early vision), the way that
the basic sensory subsystems are integrated in association areas, the neural circuitry
making up your domain general reasoning, your attentional system, your memories, and
so on; overall, the algorithm that the brain computes. I believe that Kurzweil‘s appeal to
Patternism is highly typical of the transhumanist. Indeed, consider the appeal to
patternism in the following passage of the Transhumanist FAQ, which discusses the
process of ―uploading,‖ a process which shall be important to our subsequent discussion.
―Uploading (sometimes called ―downloading‖, ―mind uploading‖ or ―brain
reconstruction‖) is the process of transferring an intellect from a biological brain
to a computer. One way of doing this might be by first scanning the synaptic
structure of a particular brain and then implementing the same computations in
an electronic medium… An upload could have a virtual (simulated) body giving
the same sensations and the same possibilities for interaction as a non-simulated
body.…And uploads wouldn‘t have to be confined to virtual reality: they could
interact with people on the outside and even rent robot bodies in order to work in
or explore physical reality…Advantages of being an upload would include:
Uploads would not be subject to biological senescence. Back-up copies of
uploads could be created regularly so that you could be re-booted if something
bad happened. (Thus your lifespan would potentially be as long as the
universe‘s.).… Radical cognitive enhancements would likely be easier to
implement in an upload than in an organic brain…. A widely accepted position is
that you survive so long as certain information patterns are conserved, such as
your memories, values, attitudes, and emotional dispositions, and so long as
there is causal continuity so that earlier stages of yourself help determine later
stages of yourself. Views differ on the relative importance of these two criteria,
but they can both be satisfied in the case of uploading. For the continuation of
personhood, on this view, it matters little whether you are implemented on a
silicon chip inside a computer or in that gray, cheesy lump inside your skull,
assuming both implementations are conscious.‖ (Bostrom, 2003a, italics mine)
This is a clear appeal to Patternism. And as we shall see, both Patternism and the process
of uploading introduce philosophical puzzles for the transhumanist case for enhancement.
Indeed, they even raise problems with the transhumanist‘s justification for mild
enhancements. As I shall now explain, such problems desperately need to be addressed.

III. Puzzles
Now that we‘ve identified the theory of personal identity that the Transhumanist
generally adopts, let us ask: At the point at which you enhance, being part natural and
part artificial, assuming a Patternist conception of the nature of persons, are you the same
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person you were before? Or is there some point in which you cease to exist, becoming a
different person entirely? Consider first a mild enhancement – the deletion of a few
memories, say, to remove bad chess playing habits and facilitate better chess strategies.
Surprisingly, it is not even clear that this enhancement would be compatible with
survival, according to Patternism. Way back in 1785, Thomas Reid raised the following,
now classic, problem for Patternism:
―Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an
orchard, to have taken a standard (a flag) from the enemy in his first campaign, and to
have been made a general in advanced life: suppose also, which must be admitted to be
possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at
school, and that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but
had absolutely lost consciousness of his flogging.‖ (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man. 1785. AD Woolsey, London, Macmillian, 1941, p. 213).

Reed‘s example presents a serious challenge to the Patternist theory. Identity is
transitive: if A=B and B=C then A=C. Patternism holds that the boy is identical to the
officer (as the officer has the boy‘s memory of the flogging) and the officer is identical to
the general (as the general was conscious of taking the flag). But notice that Patternism
cannot say that the boy is identical to the general, as the general does not recall being
flogged. Patternism violates the transitivity of identity. This is an abysmal result:
Patternism, as it stands, is not really a theory of personal identity.
But perhaps the Patternist could somehow modify her theory to allow that a gradual
change in one‘s pattern preserves personhood. Here the issues grow too complex for a
brief paper, but perhaps, for instance, an understanding of the neurodynamics underlying
ordinary cognitive changes could give the transhumanist a route into this problem. An
appeal to Dynamical Systems Theory would certainly be in keeping with the cognitive
science orientation of transhumanism. On the assumption that people normally survive
from moment to moment, we can then propose that certain therapies/enhancements
should be ‗safe‘ by Patternist standards: enhancements/therapies that modify the brain‘s
dynamical or computational structures in a way that mimics the natural process of change
in the brain. Such therapies/enhancements would preserve one‘s pattern because they
would not be a significant departure from the brain‘s characteristic dynamical patterns.14
But notice that the new Patternist theory will face the following challenge. In order for
the transhumanist to justify the sort of enhancements needed to become a cyborg, a
posthuman or a superintelligent being she will need to say that radical or unusual changes
in existing structures are compatible with the survival of the person. But does Patternism
really allow for these enhancements? For instance, what about adding an intelligence
14 . For a nice introduction to issues in Dynamical Systems Theory see Scott Kelso, Dynamical Patterns,
MIT Press and Walter Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Minds. For a more extensive discussion of the
different versions of the memory theory and ways of answering Reid‘s objection within the metaphysics
literature, as well as other objections to the theory, see the various papers in Perry, 1975 (Perry‘s
introduction is a nice overview).
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enhancing working memory chip so that one can perform better in law school? Would
this be too sharp of a break in the existing ‗pattern‘? Or what about adding a new sense
(e.g., echolocation)? It appears that merely appealing to Patternism is not enough to
justify opting for the neural enhancements that the Transhumanist envisions.
Transhumanism desparately needs to develop an informative account of personhood.
That is, for any theory of personal identity it defends, it needs to say which enhancements
are merely changes in non-essential properties and which would be changes in essential
ones. In the context of Patternism, the extreme cases are clear – a memory erasure
process that erased one‘s childhood is clearly the loss of essential property for the
continuity theory because it removes much of one‘s memories. Mere everyday cellular
maintenance by nanobots to overcome the slow effects of aging would, on this view, not
effect the identity of the person. The middle ranges cases are unclear. Maybe deleting a
few bad chess playing habits is kosher, but what about erasing a bad relationship, as in
the film Eternal Sunshine for a Spotless Mind? The path to Superintelligence may very
well be a path through ―middle range‖ enhancements. Without a firm handle on the
personal identity question, the Transhumanist developmental trajectory is perhaps the
technophile‘s alluring path to suicide.
But let us press on; let us suppose that the Transhumanist can offer a principled means of
distinguishing suicide inducing ―enhancements‖ (so to speak) from ones compatible with
survival. Nonetheless, further problems arise.
Derek Parfit’s Teleportation Case
It‘s 2080 and you are an astronaut. You attend a briefing on your next mission. You‘ve
been selected for a secret mission to a far away planet via a new means of travel.
Fortunately, your trip will be quick, indeed, much of it will be at the speed of light.
NASA superscientists will take a complete scan of your brain – capturing every detail of
its computational configuration. Your pattern – i.e., you -- will be ‗uploaded‘ and sent to
the planet, and there, your brain will be reconstructed from matter that is configured
precisely according to the information from the scan. In the process of scanning, your
earthly brain will be destroyed, but that doesn‘t matter to you. For like Ray Kurzweil, you
reject materialism; what is important to you is that your pattern will be safely housed in a
supercomputer until, in short order, it will inhabit a new brain and body. You are being
temporarily ―uploaded.‖15
Should you go? If you haven‘t studied personal identity you might be fooled into thinking
you should. But we can quickly see that you wouldn‘t survive. There may be a person
created on the planet, but it is merely your clone. We don‘t need to appeal to a particular
theory of personal identity to see this point – the idea that it would be you is flat out
contradictory. Consider that if the above scenario is possible, then it is also
metaphysically possible (i.e., conceivable) that you were not destroyed in the process.
But now, in that case, who would be on the planet? It couldn‘t be you. You are on Earth.
15 This example is modified from a classic paper by Derek Parfit, 1987.
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And because this person is clearly not you if you weren‘t destroyed, it follows that it
wasn‘t you if you were. For the life or death of another creature isn‘t an essential
property of a person. Hence, uploading doesn‘t preserve personhood.
But now Tranhumanism is in big trouble: your duplicate on the planet has your pattern,
precisely. So it must be that even an improved version of (2) is false: sameness of pattern
is not sufficient for sameness of person. As a result, Transhumanism cannot claim that
enhancement is desirable, for its very means of deciding whether it is -- its theory of
personal identity -- is seriously flawed. Further, we can use this result to prove that even
mild enhancements are death inducing. Assume your copy on the other planet is not you,
as should now be obvious. Now, consider an earlier point in your life at which time,
being a good Transhumanist, you had a gradual ‗neural regeneration‘ procedure. That is,
at each doctor visit, you had 1% of your neurons replaced by silicon based artificial
neurons having the very same computational or formal properties that normally underlie
your thoughts.16 At 100% aren‘t you analogous to the creature on the planet, being
comprised of entirely new matter? Given our earlier discussion about this creature, we
have reason to believe that this final product is not you. For the creature in the
teleportation case was clearly not you but your replica. But, at the other end, it seems that
if 1% of cells are replaced, it clearly would be you. (After all, as Kurzweil pointed out,
this cell replacement process happens to us all the time). Now, in the cases in between,
the person must either be you or a replica. But crucially, which percentage is the critical
percentage in which the resulting person would be you, and beyond which, the person is
merely a replica? But how could there be one? A few cells couldn‘t make such a
significant difference, could they? Since it is absurd to locate a critical percentage, it
must be that there is something deeply wrong with Patternist view of the self.17

IV. Conclusion
I hope all this has convinced you that if the Transhumanist maintains Patternism there are
some serious issues which require working out. Indeed, as the Transhumanist FAQ
indicates, the development of radical enhancements such as brain machine interfaces
(BMIs), cryogenic freezing for life extension, and uploading to avoid death or simply to
facilitate enhancement are key enhancements invoked by the Transhumanist view of the
development of the person. And quite ironically, all of these enhancements sound
16 This case is again inspired by Parfit, 1987. Kurzweil considers similar thought experiments in his
intriguing discussion of personal identity. Unfortunately, while he notes the problems with patternism, he
doesn‘t offer a resolution (2005, pp. 382-387). The Transhumanist FAQ actually considers a similar case:
―An alternative hypothetical uploading method would proceed more gradually: one neuron could be
replaced by an implant or by a simulation in a computer outside of the body. Then another neuron, and so
on, until eventually the whole cortex has been replaced and the person‘s thinking is implemented on
entirely artificial hardware.‖ (Bostrom, 2003a)
17 There are numerous ways that the Transhumanist could respond to the above argument. For discussion
of further Patternist options see Perry 1975. Alternately, the Transhumanist might instead accept a No Self
View, as sociologist James Hughes does in his (2004 and 2005) and in his forthcoming book, Cyborg
Buddha. (Relatedly, see also the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology‘s ―Cyborg Buddha‖ project
at: http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/cyborgbuddha).
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strangely like the thought experiments philosophers have been appealing to for years as
problem cases for various theories of the nature of persons. Given that it seems unclear
whether sameness of personhood would even be preserved by any of these enhancements,
it is fair to say that without further work on this topic, the Transhumanist cannot support
her case for enhancement. Indeed, the Transhumanist FAQ notes that transhumanists are
keenly aware that this issue has been neglected:
―While the concept of a soul is not used much in a naturalistic philosophy such
as transhumanism, many transhumanists do take an interest in the related
problems concerning personal identity (Parfit 1984) and consciousness
(Churchland 1988). These problems are being intensely studied by contemporary
analytic philosophers, and although some progress has been made, e.g. in Derek
Parfit‘s work on personal identity, they have still not been resolved to general
satisfaction.‖ (FAQ, section 5.4)
Our discussion also raises some general lessons for all parties involved in the
enhancement debate. For when one considers the enhancement debate through the lens of
the metaphysics of personhood new dimensions of the debate are appreciated. The
literature on the nature of persons is a literature that is extraordinarily rich, raising
intriguing problems for commonly, and often implicitly, accepted views of the nature of
persons that underlie positions on enhancement. And it seems fair to say that when a
theory defends or rejects a given enhancement, it is important to determine whether its
position on the enhancement in question is truly supported by, or even compatible with,
the perspective of the nature of persons that the theory is sympathetic to. Further, the
topic of the nature of persons is of clear relevance to the related topics of human nature
and human dignity, issues which are currently key points of controversy in debates over
enhancement (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 2002; Bostrom, 2007).
Perhaps, alternately, you grow weary of all this metaphysics. You may suspect that social
conventions concerning what we commonly consider to be persons are all we have
because metaphysical theorizing will never conclusively resolve what persons are.
However, as unwieldy as metaphysical issues are, it seems that not all conventions are
worthy of acceptance, so one needs a manner of determining which conventions should
play an important role in the enhancement debate and which ones should not. And it is
hard to accomplish this without getting clear on one‘s conception of persons. Further, it
is difficult to avoid at least implicitly relying on a conception of persons in the context of
reflecting on the case for and against enhancement. For what is it that ultimately grounds
your decision to enhance or not enhance if not that it will somehow improve who you
are? Are you perhaps merely planning for the well-being of your closest continuent?
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